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COMMENT
ILLINOIS LONG ARM JURISDICTION:
THE IMPLICATIONS OF A "FIXED MEANING"
Since its enactment in 1955, the Illinois long arm statute' has been con-
strued as coterminous with the requirements of due process.' Therefore, in
personam jurisdiction under the long arm statute traditionally has been upheld
I. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1981), repealed by Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209 (1981). Long arm or single-act statutes authorize a state to
assert jurisdiction over nonresidents whose actions have caused an injury within the state. Jurisdic-
tion, however, is limited to claims arising from the in-state injuries and may be exercised only
if the injury resulted from conduct specified in the statute. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC
CIVIL PROCEDURE 37 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the historical development of jurisdiction over
parties in state court litigation); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.14 (2d ed.
1977) (discussing the necessary basis for exercising personal jurisdiction under long arm statutes).
The Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209 (1981), which became
effective on July 1, 1982, repealed the Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 17 (1981). Although the provisions of the long arm statute have been numbered differently
under § 2-209, the identical language of its predecessor, § 17, has been retained. Section 2-209
provides as follows:
Act submitting to jurisdiction-Process
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person
or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits
such person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing
of any of such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
\(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State at
the time of contracting;
(5) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage and legal separation,
the maintenance in this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time this
cause of action arose or the commission in this state of any act giving
rise to the cause of action.
(b) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdicton of the
courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally serving
the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with
the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within
this State.
(c) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted
against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him or her is based
upon this Section.
(d) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in
any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IlI. 2d 432, 436,
176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961) (section 17 jurisdiction should be exerted to limits allowed by due
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by Illinois courts if minimum contacts with the state were established volun-
tarily by the nonresident defendant, the state had an interest in providing
the plaintiff with a forum for litigation, and it was not fundamentally un-
fair to assert jurisdiction.3 Consequently, Illinois courts have been able to
exercise long arm jurisdiction even when a defendant's activities did not fall
within a literal definition of the statutory language.4
Recently, however, the Illinois Supreme Court rendered two decisions which
have prompted lower courts to speculate as to whether the long arm statute
must be interpreted more restrictively than concepts of due process. In Green
v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp.5 and Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lexington
United Corp.,6 the court refused to exercise in personam jurisdiction, holding
that the acts of the nonresident defendants did not fall within the scope
of the statutory language. 7 In so holding, the court directed that the scope
of the Illinois long arm statute was not to be equated with the due process
test of minimum contacts.' The court maintained that due process merely
represents the outer limits to which a state may exert in personam
jurisdiction.9
process); Nelson v. Miller, I1 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957) (purpose of § 17
is to extend jurisdiction to constitutionally permissible limits); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 17, Constitutionality and Scope at 166 (Smith-Hurd 1968) (long arm statute and due
process are coterminous); Clearly & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Basis for the Illinois Court,
50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599, 607 (1955) (transaction of business provision of § 17 was intended
to reach to constitutional boundaries); Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Under Sec-
tion 17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 79, 80 (1958) (Illinois long arm
statute intended to extend jurisdiction to limits of due process) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents].
3. See, e.g., Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 Il1. App. 2d 242, 249, 219 N.E.2d
646, 649 (Ist Dist. 1966); see also Royce & Mason, Nonresident Jurisdiction in Business
Litigation-Part It, 53 CHI. B. REC. 161, 162 (1972) (Illinois courts will examine a defendant's
contacts with the forum state, the effects of a defendant's activities within the state, and the
fairness of permitting Illinois to be the forum).
4. See, e.g., Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce, 403 F.2d
481, 485 (7th Cir. 1968) (based on functional approach, solicitation of business found suffi-
cient to confer long arm jurisdiction); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
22 I11. 2d 432, 436, 176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1961) (jurisdictional test should be concerned with
fairness and justice); Woodfield Ford, Inc. v. Akins Ford Corp., 77 111. App. 3d 343, 346,
395 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (lst Dist. 1979) (exercise of long arm jurisdiction based on reasonableness);
Ziegler v. Hodges, 80 111. App. 2d 210, 214, 224 N.E.2d 12, 14 (2d Dist. 1967) (long arm
jurisdiction is not limited to situations in which the statutory language literally describes a defen-
dant's activities); Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 I11. App. 2d 242, 248, 219 N.E.2d
646, 649 (Ist Dist. 1966) (jurisdiction may be exercised even though a defendant's activities
are not described literally by statutory language).
5. 86 111. 2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
6. 87 111. 2d 190, 429 N.E.2d 847 (1981).
7. Id. at 198, 429 N.E.2d at 850; Green, 86 Ill. 2d at 440-41, 427 N.E.2d at 1208.
8. In Green, the court proclaimed that the Illinois long arm statute "should have a fixed
meaning without regard to changing concepts of due process." 86 111. 2d at 436, 427 N.E.2d
at 1206. This concept was reiterated in Cook when the court stated that the limits of the Il-
linois statute "are not to be equated with the 'minimum contacts' test under the due process
clause." 87 Ill. 2d at 197, 429 N.E.2d at 850.
9. Cook, 87 Ill. 2d at 197, 429 N.E.2d at 850; Green, 86 111. 2d at 436, 427 N.E.2d at 1206.
ILLINOIS LONG ARM JURISDICTION
Neither Green nor Cook expressly mandates a more restrictive interpreta-
tion of the long arm statute. Rather, the decisions decree that a fixed mean-
ing, independent of due process, must be developed for the statutory
provisions.'" This decree reflects the court's skepticism regarding use of the
due process standard as a basis for interpreting the statutory language.
Moreover, the significance of the decree is its acknowledgement that the
guidelines necessary to assist both practitioners and the courts in ascertain-
ing the viability of long arm jurisdiction challenges must be derived from
the statutory provisions. Nevertheless, by recognizing that a state statute may
be narrower than due process, the supreme court seemingly has empowered
Illinois courts to interpret the long arm statute more restrictively than re-
quired by the due process minimum contacts test.
In order to comprehend the implications of a narrower interpretation of
the long arm statute, it is necessary to examine both the context in which
the Illinois statute evolved, and the scope of long arm jurisdiction decisions
prior to Green and Cook. Thereafter, a review of the decisions in Green
and Cook reveals that the court, in enunciating its fixed meaning directive,
failed to state whether formulation of the fixed meaning should be governed
by a broad, narrow, or intermediate interpretation of the statutory language.
An analysis of decisions rendered after Green and Cook demonstrates that
the present uncertainty surrounding the scope of the long arm statute was
fostered by the vagueness of the supreme court's directive. Notwithstanding
the language in Green and Cook, which seemingly requires a more restric-
tive interpretation, this Comment concludes that the broad interpretation
historically accorded to the Illinois long arm statute will remain intact.
BACKGROUND
Emergence of the Illinois Long Arm Statute
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment limits a state's power
to exercise in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.'' As origin-
10. See supra note 8.
11. In personam jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the parties. The ability of a court to enter
a legally binding judgment is predicated on the existence of jurisdiction over both the parties
and the subject matter of the lawsuit. See, e.g., Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461
F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1972) (it is essential that a court have jurisdiction over both subject
matter and parties); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 431 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (N.D. Ill.) (jurisdiction
over both subject matter and parties is required), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
The due process clause 'of the fourteenth amendment, which limits the ability of a court
to exercise personal jurisdiction, mandates that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If a court ex-
ceeds the due process limitations when asserting personal jurisdiction, the judgment will be
rendered void in that state and will not be entitled to full faith and credit in other states.
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 1, § 12.13; Hazard, A General Theory of State Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 256-58.
The United States Supreme Court has attempted to define the limits imposed by the due
process clause on the power of a state to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
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ally interpreted in Pennoyer v. Neff,'2 the due process limitation encom-
passed concepts of federalism 3 and prohibited states from asserting personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, unless those defendants voluntarily
appeared before the court" or were physically present within the state.'" In
1945, however, the United States Supreme Court de-emphasized the notions
of federalism articulated in Pennoyer and focused on whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction would be fair to the defendant. In International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,'6 the Court transformed the presence and consent theories
of due process into the minimum contacts doctrine. 7 The International Shoe
dants. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) (a plaintiff's rights and connec-
tions with a forum are irrelevant if a defendant has no contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (a defendant's contacts with the state must be
such that he would have reason to anticipate having to defend a lawsuit there); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96-98 (1978) (courts must consider a defendant's conduct in the forum
state, not only the effects of his conduct); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (the
primary focus should be on the ncxus between the forum, the defendant, and the litigation);
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (a defendant's acts must show purposeful avail-
ment of the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (if the state has a manifest interest in providing
redress, jurisdiction may be upheld despite the fact that the corporate defendant never sent
its agent into the state); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (to
ensure fairness, the defendant must have minimum contacts with the state); Pennoyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (a defendant must be within the territorial boundaries of the state,
otherwise the state lacks in personam jurisdiction). For further discussion of the constitutional
limits on state long arm jurisdiction, see Comment, Federalism, Due Process and Minimum
Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1341 (1980) (discussing
the role of federalism in jurisdictional due process); Comment, Constitutional Limitations on
State Long An'n Jurisdiction, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 156 (1982) (setting forth the rules and prin-
ciples that define the constitutional limits of state long arm jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Constitutional Limitations]; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: A
Limit to the Expansion of Long-Armn Jurisdiction, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 611 (1981) (critically
analyzing World- Wide Volkswagen and its possible effects on state court assertions of jurisdic-
tion over nonresidents) [hcreinafter cited as Note, World-Wide Volkswagen].
12. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
13. In Pennoyer, Justice Field stated that "[the several states are of equal dignity and
authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others." Id.
at 722. Because each state possesses its own independent authority, Justice Field concluded
that each state had exclusive jurisdiction over all persons and property within its territory,
but had no direct jurisdiction over persons or property outside its boundaries. Id.
14. Id. at 720.
15. Id.
16. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. The theory of territorialism articulated in Pennover had begun to erode prior to Inter-
national Shoe. This doctrinal erosion was caused by the judicial creation of the fictional con-
cepts of consent and presence, and by the statutory creation of agents upon whom service
of process could be effectuated if the defendant was not found within the state. See, e.g.,
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (upholding a statute allowing ser-
vice on agents of nonresident individuals doing business in the state); Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1.927) (under a nonresident motorist statute, consent was implied by use of highways
and service of process could be effected on a state official as an agent); Barrow S.S. Co.
v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898) (a nonresident corporation doing business within the state was
deemed present); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S.(How.) 404 (1855) (the ability of a
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Court determined that due process would be satisfied if the nonresident defen-
dant had minimum contacts with the state so that maintenance of the suit
would not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 8
Application of a mechanical rule, however, is inapposite in assessing
whether specific activities are sufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test.'9
Instead, satisfaction of due process is dependent upon the "quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws." 2
Consequently, judicial adoption of the broad and flexible constitutional stan-
dard of minimum contacts vested in the states a wide latitude to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction.2' Many states, including Illinois, responded to this expanded
view of due process by enacting long arm statutes. 2
The Illinois long arm statute23 provides that any resident or nonresident
nonresident corporation to conduct business in a state could be conditioned on its consent
to be sued there).
In International Shoe, however, the Court expressly rejected physical presence as a prere-
quisite to obtaining an in personam judgment. 326 U.S. at 316. Indeed, the Court recognized
that by conducting activities in the state, nonresidents often invoke the benefits and protections
of that state's laws without ever being physically present. When obligations arise from such
activities or contacts a defendant can be required to appear in court without violating the due
process safeguards. Id. at 319.
18. 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
19. Id. at 319. The International Shoe Court stated that "[t]he boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a [defendant] to suit, and those which do not, cannot
be simply mechanical or quantitative. Id. Whether minimum contacts exist will depend
on the facts of each case. Id.
Since its decision in International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court has articulated
a framework for analyzing minimum contacts questions. First, the primary focus should be
on "the relationship between the defendant, the forum and the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Regardless of the plaintiff's right and connection with the forum,
jurisdiction may not be asserted if the nonresident defendant does have contacts with the forum
state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980). Second, a defendant's contact with the state
must be such that the defendant would have reason to anticipate "being haled into court"
in the forum state. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
This requirement is satisfied when there exists "some act by which defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the State. ... Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The rationale underlying this principle is that a defendant, having ac-
cepted the benefits and protections conferred by a state's laws, cannot object to the legal obliga-
tions which accompany those benefits.
Within this framework, the minimum contacts requirements must be satisified as to each
defendant. Contacts of one defendant may not be attributed to another merely because the
defendants have common interests. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
20. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
21. See Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 536.
22. Illinois was the first state to adopt a long arm statute. See M. GREEN, supra note 1,
at 37; Currie, supra note 21, at 537. A number of states have used the Illinois statute as a
model when enacting their long arm statutes. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 5-514 (1979); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 704-A (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW
§ 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185 (1962 & Supp. 1982).
23. The Illinois long arm statute was adopted in 1955. Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV.
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who, in person or through an agent, 24 engages in any of the enumerated
acts within the state, submits to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts for any
cause of action arising therefrom. 25 The enumerated acts include the trans-
action of business; the commission of a tortious act; the ownership, use,
or possession of real estate; the formation of a contract to insure any person,
property, or risk; and the maintenance of a matrimonial domicile.26 Both
resident and nonresident plaintiffs may invoke the statute as a means to
subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of an Illinois court.27
The long arm statute is designed to expand the jurisdictional reach of Il-
linois state courts,2" and it accomplishes this by permitting extraterritorial
STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1981), repealed by Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, § 2-209 (1981).
24. By using the term any person, the statute eliminates any distinction between nonresi-
dent individuals and corporations. Id.; see, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 385, 143
N.E.2d 673, 677 (1957) (minimum contacts principle applies to individuals and corporations);
Sunday v. Donovan, 16 Ill. App. 2d 116, 119-20, 147 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1st Dist. 1958) (citing
Nelson v. Miller to support the proposition that the Illinois long arm statute reaches both
individuals and corporations); see also Currie, supra note 21, at 561 (noting that § 17 of the
Civil Practice Act provides jurisdiction over corporations as well as persons).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209(a), (c) (1981). Jurisdiction may not be exercised unless
a close relationship exists between the cause of action and the jurisdictional acts of the nonresi-
dent defendant. Volkswagen Ins. Co. v. Whittington, 58 Ill. App. 3d 621, 624, 374 N.E.2d
954, 957 (Ist Dist. 1978). Moreover, any cause of action must "be one which lies in the wake
of activities by which defendant submitted to jurisdiction of Illinois courts." Bodine's, Inc.
v. Sunno-O, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1297, 1285 (N.D. Il. 1980); Volkswagen Ins. Co. v. Whit-
tington, 58 Il1. App. 2d at 624, 374 N.E.2d at 957.
Although the long arm statute may not be invoked to confer jurisdiction when a cause of
action does not arise from the enumerated acts, jurisdiction may be maintained pursuant to
preexisting common law methods. For example, under the common law doing business doc-
trine a state may assert personal jurisdiction even though the cause of action did not arise
from the defendant's conduct within the state. See, e.g., Perkins v. Beguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-48 (1952) (when a defendant conducts substantial business in a state,
federal due process is not violated if that state exercises jurisdiction over matter arising outside
of the state); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff, 68 111. 2d 38, 44, 369 N.E.2d 52, 54
(1977) (a state may assert jurisdiction over "out-of-state activities" when a corporate defen-
dant engages in substantial in-state business). For further discussion of the doing business doc-
trine, see infra note 47.
26. See supra note 1.
27. See, e.g., Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1972)
(for purposes of long arm jurisdiction it is irrelevant that neither party is an Illinois resident);
Tamari v. Bache & Co., 431 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (N.D. Ill.) (long arm jurisdiction sustained
although neither party was an Illinois resident), aff'd, 565 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
28. In effect, long arm statutes also have expanded the jurisdictional reach of the federal
courts. Under rules 4(d)(7) and 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts
are authorized to follow state rules regarding the service of process on nonresidents. FED. R.
Ctv. P. 4(d)(7), 4(e); see also O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1174 (7th Cir.
1971) (under Rule 4(d)(7), service on a nonreL.i.ient is effectuated in accord with state rules);
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 385, 389 (N.D.
111. 1979) (in a diversity action, Rule 4(d)(7) requires compliance with state rules); Rosenthal
& Co. v. Dodick, 365 F. Supp. 847, 849 (N.D. I1. 1967) (state rules regarding personal jurisdiction
must be followed under Rule 4(e)).
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service of process on nonresidents who possess the requisite nexus with the
state.2 9 The effect of the statute has been to alleviate many of the hardships
and inequities imposed upon Illinois residents by the strict physical presence
requirements of the jurisdictional statute previously in effect in Illinois. 3 1
Prior to the enactment of the long arm statute, an Illinois resident was unable
to obtain redress in an Illinois court unless the nonresident defendant con-
sented to jurisdiction, was served with process while physically present, was
doing business within the state, or had an agent conducting such business.3
Thus, if a person or corporation voluntarily came to Illinois, entered into
a contract with an Illinois resident, departed from the state, and then breached
the contract, the Illinois resident was compelled either to suffer the incon-
venience and expense of litigating in a foreign state, or to forego pursuing
the legal claim.
Soon after its enactment, the long arm statute was sustained as constitu-
tional by the Illinois Supreme Court in Nelson v. Miller.32 The Nelson court
declared that the statute reflected a "conscious purpose to assert jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process
clause."" Recognition of the legislative intent to expand the in personam
jurisdiction of Illinois courts to the limits permitted by the due process clause
prompted a broad statutory construction.
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,34 a decision of
national importance in the jurisprudence of long arm jurisdiction, exemplifies
the liberal interpretation accorded to the Illinois statute.35 In Gray, a nonresi-
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209(b) (1981). For the text of § 2-209(b), see supra note 1.
30. The long arm statute was preceded by a jurisdictional statute which was enacted in
1933. Under the earlier statute, a corporation could be subjected to the jurisdiction of Illinois
courts only if an officer or agent of the corporation could be served with process within the
state. Illinois Civil Practice Act § 17, 1933 Ill. Laws 784, 798 (repealed 1955).
31. For a discussion of the consent, physical presence, and agency theories of jurisdiction,
see supra note 17. For a discussion of the doing business doctrine, see supra note 25 and
infra note 47. When jurisdiction does not exist under the Illinois long arm statute, these theories
remain viable alternatives for obtaining jurisdiction. See Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents,
supra note 2, at 82; see also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209(d) (1981).
32. 11 I1l. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). In Nelson, the Illinois long arm statute was
held to be consistent with both the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article 11, § 2 of the Illinois Constitution. Id. Article 1I, § 2 was the due process provision
of the Illinois Constitution. See ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. 11, § 2.
33. 11 Ill. 2d at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679.
34. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
35. A number of the states that enacted statutes which were modeled after the Illinois long
arm statute found the liberality of the Illinois interpretation unacceptable, and therefore refused
to follow the holding of Gray. See O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 111-12,
169 S.E.2d 827, 832, (jurisdiction denied when an act outside the state caused an injury within
the state), aff'd, 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519 (1969); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes
& Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 460, 209 N.E.2d 68, 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 21, cert. denied,
382 U.S. 905 (1965) (a mere injury in the state does not fall within the meaning of the statute;
a court must focus on whether an act occurred within the state). It is interesting to note that
soon after these decisions were rendered, both the Georgia and the New York legislatures amended
their long arm statutes to provide for jurisdiction when a tortious act committed outside the
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dent defendant negligently manufactured a safety valve in Ohio and sold
it to another company outside Illinois.16 The valve was installed in a water
heater in Pennsylvania and sold to an Illinois resident who was injured when
the water heater exploded." The Illinois Supreme Court found that because
the injury had occurred in Illinois, a tortious act had been committed within
the state.38 In reaching this conclusion, the Gray court proclaimed that the
construction of the long arm statute should be based not on technical defini-
tions but, rather, on the general purposes of convenience and justice which
underlie the statute. 9
In evaluating the jurisdictional question, the Gray court acknowledged that
when a long arm statute enumerates specific acts upon which jurisdiction
must be predicated, there are two relevant inquiries in ascertaining whether
jurisdiction is appropriate. ° First, it must be determined whether the trans-
action or act of the nonresident falls within the language of the statute.4 1
Second, even if jurisdiction would be permissible under the statute, the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction must be consonant with due process.42 Because the Il-
linois statute has been viewed as expanding in personam jurisdiction to the
limits permitted by the due process clause, courts repeatedly have construed
the statute as based on the due process test of minimum contacts.43 As a
result, the two step analysis acknowledged in Gray has been merged into
a single prong-minimum contacts.
state caused an injury within the state. See GA. CODE § 24-113.1(c) (1981); N.Y. Ctv. PRAC.
LAW § 302(3) (McKinney 1972).
36. 22 Ill. 2d at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
37. Id.
38. The Gray court stated that "[ijn law the place of wrong is where the last event takes
place which is necessary to render the actor liable." Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63 (citing
the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377). The court reasoned that the defendant's
negligence outside the state could not be separated from the injury that it caused within the
state. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 763. See generally Currie, supra note 21, at 552-53. Professor
Currie cautions that strict application of the Restatement of Conflicts principle may lead to
unfortunate results because a strict application would be in direct conflict with the International
Shoe Court's admonition against application of a mechanical rule. Id.
39. 22 Ill. 2d at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
40. Id, at 433, 176 N.E.2d at 762; see also Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997,
1000 (N.D. 111. 1980) (a bifurcated analysis is required under the Illinois long arm statute);
Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1008-09 (N.D.
111. 1973) (both statutory and constitutional questions are involved in long arm analysis); Koplin
v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 111. App. 2d 242, 246, 219 N.E.2d 646, 648 (1st Dist. 1966)
(long arm jurisdiction is proper when a defendant's activities fall within the ambit of the statutory
language and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 1, § 12.14. But cf. CAL. Ctv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) (the sole inquiry
is whether due process has been satisfied).
41. See cases and treatises cited supra note 40.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1000 (N.D. 111. 1980); Wisconsin
Can Co. v. Banite, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 597, 600 (N.D. Il1. 1980); accord Scoville Mfg. Co. v.
Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1972) (the defendant's acts fulfilled the minimum
contacts test which underlies the definition of transaction of business); O'Hare Int'l Bank v.
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Long Arm Jurisdiction Prior to Green and Cook
Prior to Green and Cook, Illinois courts focused on the specific contacts
that nonresident defendants had with the state, rather than whether those
contacts fell within the technical meaning of the statute."" The majority of
the decisions concerning the Illinois long arm statute involved the transac-
tion of business and tortious act components. Thus, analysis of decisions
construing those particular provisions is beneficial in illustrating the types
of activities which have been deemed sufficient to give an Illinois court in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
a. Section 17(1)(a) Transaction of Business
Section 17(l)(a) applies to both individuals and corporations, 5 and pro-
vides that any nonresident who transacts business within the state is subject
to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts for any cause of action arising from
that transaction." The section 17(l)(a) standards are less stringent than the
general jurisdiction doing business standard"' which requires continuous and
Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1971) (section 17 jurisdiction existed because minimum
contacts were satisfied); Chicago Silver Exch. v. United Refinery, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1332,
1337 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (the defendant's minimum contacts were sufficient to invoke § 17 jurisdic-
tion); Johnston v. United Presbyterian Church, 103 Il1. App. 3d 869, 873, 431 N.E.2d 1275,
1278 (1st Dist. 1981) (both the minimum contacts requirement of § 17 and due process must
be satisfied); Morton v. Environmental Land Sys., Ltd., 55 Ill. App. 3d 369, 372, 370 N.E.2d
1106, 1109 (1st Dist. 1977) (the defendant's minimum contacts satisfied the requirements of
both § 17 and due process); Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 Il. App. 2d 242, 249, 219
N.E.2d 646, 649 (lst Dist. 1966) (Illinois courts examine long arm jurisdiction based on due
process considerations).
44. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 24. Nevertheless, there are limits on the imputation of jurisdiction. Jurisdic-
tion over a corporation may not be transferred or imputed to agents of the corporation who
personally have not engaged in activities that independently support jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bur-
wood Prods. CO. v. Marsel Mirror & Glass Prods., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. 111. 1979);
Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Leonard Storch Enter., 66 I11. App. 3d 789, 383 N.E.2d 1379
(1st Dist. 1979). Further, jurisdiction over an individual acting outside his capacity as an agent
may not be imputed to the corporation. See Chicago Silver Exch. v. United Refinery, Inc.,
394 F. Supp. 1332 (N.D. I11. 1975). But see Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1003
(N.D. I11. 1980) (contrary to precedent, jurisdiction was exercised over two individual defen-
dants on the basis of acts consummated in their capacity as managing agents).
46. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(l)(a) (1981). The corresponding provision as reenacted
in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure is § 2-209(a)(1). See supra note 1.
47. In Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. I11. 1957), the court stated
in dictum that "the words of subsection (a) of Section 17 cannot be given a restrictive inter-
pretation based on the old Illinois 'doing business' cases. The subsection speaks of 'tran-
saction of business within the State' not of 'doing business' here." Id. at 567.
Under the doing business doctrine a state may exert personal jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration on the theory that the corporation is constructively present, and has given its implied
consent to have its agent served. In order to satisfy the doing business standard, the business
conducted must be "of such a character and extent as to warrant the inference that the cor-
poration has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served
and in which it is bound to appear when a proper agent has been served with process." Pembleton
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substantial business activity within the state. Under the transaction of business
provision of the long arm statute, an isolated transaction may be sufficient
to confer in personam jurisdiction. 8 In situations where a single transaction
is involved, however, there are two pertinent inquiries.
The first inquiry involves ascertaining which party initiated the transac-
tion. When the nonresident defendant, or his agent, has entered the state
to initiate a business transaction with the plaintiff, jurisdiction has been
upheld consistently. 9 On the other hand, when the plaintiff's agent seeks
out the defendant in a foreign state, jurisdiction has been denied unless other
significant contacts between the defendant and the state were established. 0
v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n, 289 Ill. 99, 104, 124 N.E. 355, 358 (1919), appeal dismiss-
ed, 253 U.S. 499 (1920). Thus, the term doing business has been construed as requiring that
a defendant conduct systematic and substantial business in the state. See, e.g., St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff, 68 111. 2d 38, 45, 369 N.E.2d 52, 55 (1977) (railroad's activities
held sufficiently substantial to constitute doing business); Hertz Corp. v. Taylor, 15 Ill. 2d
552, 554, 155 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1959) (sufficient course of business conferred jurisdicton); Note,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations "Doing Business" in Another State, 38 ILL. L. REV.
424, 427 (1945) (isolated business activity does not constitute doing business).
48. E.g., Cook Assoc., Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co., 14 Ill. App. 3d 965, 969,
304 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1st Dist. 1973) (single business transaction held sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion); see also Johnston v. United Presbyterian Church, 103 111. App. 3d 869, 874, 431 N.E.2d
1275, 1279 (lst Dist. 1981) (citing Cook Assoc., Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co. to sup-
port the proposition that a single business transaction can be sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
But see Woodfield Ford, Inc. v. Akins Ford Corp., 7 Ill. App. 3d 343, 348, 395 N.E.2d 1131,
1135 (1st Dist. 1979) (jurisdiction is not supported by an isolated business transaction when
the defendant did not avail himself voluntarily of the benefits of Illinois law).
49. See, e.g., Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 461 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir. 1972)
(to promote business, the defendant attended three meetings held at the Chicago Housewares
Show; thus, the defendant was subject to Illinois long arm jurisdiction); Consolidated Laboratories
v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 1967) (negotiations in Illinois regarding
an original contract and its modification held to be within the ambit of § 17(1)(a)); United
Air Lines v. Conductron Corp., 69 Ill. App. 3d 847, 853, 387 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (1st Dist.
1979) (a single meeting in Chicago, regarding a purchase contract, subjected the defendant
to Illinois long arm jurisdiction); Morton v. Environmental Land Sys., 55 Ill. App. 3d 369,
372-73, 370 N.E.2d 1106, 1110 (Ist Dist. 1977) (solicitation within Illinois supported jurisdic-
tion even though formal acceptance of the contract occurred outside the state and Illinois law
was not to govern the agreement).
50. See, e.g., Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586 F.2d 49, 51 (7th Cir.
1978) (no jurisdiction exists when a nonresident lessee was brought into contract with an Il-
linois lessor through acts of a nonresident agent of the lessor); Wessel Co. v. Yoffee & Beit-
man Management Corp., 457 F. Supp. 939, 941 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (when the plaintiff's nonresi-
dent agent submitted a bid to the defendant, subsequent telephone calls by the defendant to
Illinois did not confer jurisdicton); Geneva Indus. v. Copeland Constr. Corp., 312 F. Supp.
186, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (because a contractual relationship was initiated by the out-of-state
agent of an Illinois corporation, jurisdiction could not be conferred on the basis of negotia-
tions conducted by telephone and letter).
The stated rationale for denying jurisdiction when the plaintiff has initiated the business
transaction is that the plaintiff should not be allowed to lure a nonresident into the state.
Chicago Film Enter. v. Jablanow, 5 Ill. App. 3d 739, 742, 371 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1st Dist.
1977). Because the long arm statute is concerned with a defendant's actions, the unilateral
acts of the plaintiff are insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id.
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The second inquiry involves determining where the transaction of business
took place. The 'alleged facts must establish either that the defendant per-
formed, or should have performed, the contractual obligations in Illinois,"
or that the parties intended that the plaintiff would perform the contractual
obligations in Illinois for the benefit of the defendant.5 2 Therefore, when
an isolated business transaction is the basis of the lawsuit, personal jurisdic-
tion exists only if evidence establishes that the defendant initiated the trans-
action by coming to Illinois, or that the contract required at least partial
performance in Illinois.
Section 17(1)(a) has also been interpreted to permit Illinois courts to assert
in personam jurisdiction irrespective of whether the defendant or his agent
ever was physically present in Illinois." Nevertheless, cases that sustain per-
sonal jurisdiction in the absence of the defendant's physical presence indicate
that at least part of the contract was, or should have been, performed in
Illinois, that Illinois law governed the contract, or that the defendant solicited
51. See, e.g., Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Leonard Storch Enter., 66 I11. App. 3d 789,
798, 383 N.E.2d 1379, 1386 (1st Dist. 1978) (in a lawsuit by a purchaser, the defendant's ship-
ment of, or agreement to ship, goods to Illinois is sufficient to establish jurisdiction); Tabor
& Co. v. McNall, 30 I11. App. 3d 593, 595, 333 N.E.2d 562, 563 (4th Dist.) (section 17(l)(a)
was satisfied because the contract required that the defendant perform in Illinois by delivering
grain), appeal denied, 61 Ill. 2d 600 (1975).
52. See, e.g., Ward v. Formex, Inc., 27 Ill. App. 3d 22, 25, 325 N.E.2d 812, 815 (2d
Dist. 1975) (jurisdiction upheld when a contract required the plaintiff to process the defen-
dant's film in Illinois); Colony Press, Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 11. App. 3d 14, 18, 308 N.E.2d
78, 80 (1st Dist. 1974) (jurisdiction sustained when the defendant ordered advertising materials
by telephone and the plaintiff printed the advertisements in Illinois after receiving the defen-
dant's approval); Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co., 14 111. App. 3d 965,
970, 304 N.E.2d 27, 31 (st Dist. 1973) (jurisdiction upheld when an Illinois employment agency
recommended potential employees upon the defendant's request); Ziegler v. Hodges, 80 I11.
App. 2d 210, 217, 224 N.E.2d 12, 15 (2d Dist. 1967) (personal jurisdiction existed because
the defendant intended that the plaintiff would write part of a textbook in Illinois).
53. In Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 11. App. 2d 242, 254, 219 N.E.2d 646, 652
(1st Dist. 1966), noting that the Illinois Supreme Court had rejected a physical presence re-
quirement under the tortious act provision of the long arm statute, the appellate court con-
cluded that presence should not be a controlling factor under the transaction of business provi-
sion. The Koplin court declared: "To employ different tests for subsection (a) and (b) is not
to implement the intended effect of section 17, for when jurisdiction is based on a contract
rather than on a tort the interest of the State is not less, nor is the burden on the defendant
more." Id.; see also O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1971)
(the nonresident defendant's physical presence within the state is not required in order to assert
personal jurisdiction if the act or transaction at issue is substantially connected with the forum
state); Woodfield Ford, Inc. v. Akins Ford Corp., 77 Ill. App. 3d 343, 348, 395 N.E.2d 1131,
1135 (1st Dist. 1979) (it is not necessary to find that the corporate defendant was physically
present in the state to conclude that it was transacting business in the state under the long
arm statute).
While physical presence is not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, the mere fact
that a nonresident was present is not always sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements.
See E. Walters & Co. v. Interastra, S.A., 67 F.R.D. 410, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (because the
cause of action was not based on acts committed by the defendant within the state, no jurisdic-
tion existed despite the defendant's physical presence).
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the contract." Thus, under the transaction of business provision of the Il-
linois long arm statute, a defendant may be compelled to appear in court
despite the lack of a technical transaction of business within the state.
b. Section 17(1)(b) Tortious Act
Section 17(1)(b) provides that a nonresident defendant will be subject to
the jurisdiction of an Illinois court for the commission of a tortious act
within the state. The term tortious act, as contained in section 17(l)(b), refers
to any breach of duty which leads to liability for damages. 55 The term en-
compasses an isolated tort 6 and is applicable to conduct resulting in economic
as well as physical injury." Thus, negligence," libel," breach of an implied
54. See, e.g., O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1973) (jurisdic-
tion sustained because a guaranty was governed by Illinois law and its performance was to
occur in Illinois); Tamari v. Bache & Co., 431 F. Supp. 1226, 1227-28 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (jurisdiction
held proper when the defendant transmitted commodities orders from Lebanon for execution
on the Chicago exchange); Morton v. Environmental Land Sys., 55 Ill. App. 3d 369, 372-73,
370 N.E.2d 1106, 1110 (Ist Dist. 1977) (solicitation within Illinois supported jurisdiction even
though formal acceptance of the contract occurred outside the state and Illinois law did not
govern the agreement); Ziegler v. Hodges, 80 Ill. App. 2d 210, 217, 224 N.E.2d 12, 15 (2d
Dist. 1967) (a contract to prepare a textbook which was solicited by the defendant, performed
in Illinois and governed by Illinois law was held sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
55. E.g., Florendo v. Pan Hemisphere Transp., 419 F. Supp. 16, 17 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Poindex-
ter v. Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 217-18, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (5th Dist. 1967). For a discussion
of the ramifications of a narrower interpretation of the term tortious act, see Comment, Jurisdic-
tion Over Nonresidents, supra note 2, at 85-86.
The allegations appearing in the complaint will determine whether a tortious act exists for
purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction. First Nat'l Bank v. Screen Gems, Inc., 40 111. App.
3d 427, 433, 352 N.E.2d 285, 290 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 64 IIl. 2d 595 (1976); accord Estate
of Wrigley v. Wrigley, 104 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1020, 433 N.E.2d 995, 1005 (1st Dist. 1982)
(personal jurisdiction was denied because the petition failed to establish either a duty or an
activity constituting a breach of duty).
56. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) (section 17(l)(b) jurisdiction held proper when a water heater, manufactured
in a foreign state, exploded and caused injury in Illinois); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Il1. 2d 378,
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (the negligent act of the defendant in unloading a truck in Illinois held
sufficient to confer jurisdiction).
57. E.g., Bodine's Inc. v. Sunny-O, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1279, 1282-83 (N.D. Ill. 1980); see
also Ragold v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117, 120 (N.D. I11. 1980) (unfair competi-
tion is within the ambit of § 17(l)(b)); Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw,
Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (N.D. I11. 1973) (fraudulent misrepresentation is indistinguishable
from a physical injury tort under § 17(l)(b)).
58. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961) (long arm jurisdiction held proper when the negligent manufacture of a
water heater safety valve injured an Illinois resident); Nelson v. Miller, 11 IUI. 2d 378, 143
N.E.2d 673 (1957) (negligence in unloading a stove from a truck in Illinois was governed by
§ 17(l)(b)).
59. See, e.g., Process Church of Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (Gray contemplation test applied to a libel action); Novel v. Garrison, 204 F. Supp.
825 (N.D. Il1. 1969) (holding that a defendant who gave an interview to a Chicago-based publica-
tion in New Orleans committed libel in Illinois).
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warranty," ° conspiracy, 6' fraud, 62  patent infringement,6 3  and unfair
competition 6  have been recognized as falling within the scope of section
17(1)(b).
In order for a tortious act to be committed in the state, it has not been
essential that all the elements of the tort occur in Illinois.65 Rather, section
17(l)(b) has been deemed to confer jurisdiction when either the wrongful
act, or the injury caused by the wrongful act, occurred within the state.6 6
Consequently, jurisdiction has been exercised under section 17(l)(b) even when
a defendant never was physically present within the state, and, in fact, com-
mitted the wrongful act outside Illinois.
6 7
In cases in which the nonresident defendant committed a tortious act out-
side of Illinois, which has an injurious effect in Illinois, two factors have
been considered relevant in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction
is proper. First, courts have attempted to ascertain whether the defendant
had reason to anticipate that his actions would cause effects in Illinois, 6
60. See, e.g., Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1965)
(breach of implied warranty is within the "tortious act" language of § 17(l)(b)).
61. See, e.g., Payne v. AHFI Netherlands, B.V., 482 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. 111. 1980) (a
conspiracy to convert property and funds constituted a tortious act); Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet,
Inc., v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (a conspiracy between a bank and an
automobile purchaser was a tortious act subject to § 17(l)(b)).
62. See, e.g., Bodine's, Inc. v. Sunny-O, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (tortious
fraud in the sale of inferior quality orange juice concentrate supported Illinois jurisdiction);
Southeast Guar. Trust Co. v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. I11. 1973)
(the transfer of misinformation regarding the validity of bonds constituted a tortious act under
§ 17(l)(b)).
63. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (sec-
tion 17(l)(b) jurisdiction exercised in a patent infringement action); Welch Scientific Co. v.
Human Eng'g Inst., Inc., 416 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1969) (alleged patent infringement constituted
a tortious act), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970); cf. Burwood Prods. Co. v. Marsel Mirror
& Glass Prods., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Il. 1979) (copyright infringement constituted
a tortious act).
64. See, e.g., Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S.A., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(violations of the Lanham Act constitute the tort of unfair competition under § 17(1)(b));
Chromium Indust. v. Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Il1. 1978) (anti-
trust claims are within the scope of the tortious act provision of the long arm statute).
65. See generally Comment, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents, supra note 2, at 85-87 (noting
that if the statute required that all the elements of the tort must occur in Illinois, jurisdiction
would be restricted severely, thus defeating the intention of the legislature).
66. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 435-36,
176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 377).
67. Id. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), with O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 120 Ga. App. 106, 169 S.E.2d 827,
aff'd, 225 Ga. 778, 171 S.E.2d 519 (1969), and Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 15 'N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905
(1965). Although the facts of O'Neal Steel and Longines were similar to the facts of Gray,
jurisdiction was denied under the Georgia and New York long arm statutes, respectively, because
only the injury caused by the wrongful act had occurred within the state.
68. E.g., Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (N.D. Ill.
1967); Anderson v. Penncraft Tool eo., 200 F. Supp. 145, 146 (N.D. Ill. 1961); see also Payne
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or that one of his products would be used within the state."9 Second, courts
have attempted to determine whether the defendant invoked the benefits and
protections of Illinois laws in connection with the allegedly tortious activity.7"
If either of these factors was found to exist, then personal jurisdiction could
be asserted under section 17(l)(b). The rationale underlying this exercise of
jurisdiction was that a defendant who knowingly engaged in acts which caused
effects in Illinois, or who accepted the benefits and protections conferred
by the laws of the state, could not object to the obligations that resulted
from his acts. 7' Thus, similar to the transaction of business provision of
the long arm statute, judicial construction of section 17(l)(b) in decisions
rendered prior to Green and Cook was guided by due process minimum con-
tacts considerations, rather than by the literal meaning of the statutory
language.
THE CONTROVERSIES PRESENTED IN GREEN AND COOK
Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp.
The controversy in Green involved four parties: Advance Ross Corpora-
tion ("Advance Ross"), a parent corporation headquartered in Illinois; Ad-
vance Ross Electronics Corporation ("Electronics"), a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary incorporated in Illinois but conducting business in Texas; and two
Texas residents, Roy W. Green, Jr., and Roy W. Green, Sr.72 During the
period from 1970 to 1975, Green, Sr., was the president of Electronics and
Advance Ross Steel Corporation ("Steel").73 Steel also was a subsidiary of
Advance Ross but was incorporated and doing business in Texas.7 In 1975,
v. AHFI Netherlands, B.V., 482 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (N.D. 111. 1980) (the counterdefendant
reasonably should have known that the alleged conversion would have injurious effect in Illinois).
69. See, e.g., Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. Ill. 1965)
(the defendant reasonably could anticipate that a product sold from dealer to dealer ultimately
would arrive in Illinois); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I1l. 2d
432, 442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) (exercise of jurisdiction was not unfair when the defen-
dant had contemplated that its product would be used in Illinois).
70. See, e.g., Florendo v. Pan Hemisphere Transp., 419 F. Supp. 16, 19 (N.D. 111. 1976)
(jurisdiction upheld because the defendant invoked benefits of Illinois law by selling securities
to an Illinois resident); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432,
442, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) (even an indirect benefit from Illinois laws will support jurisdic-
tion when a defective product causes an injury in Illinois).
71. This rationale was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The same rationale was applied by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). The Gray court stated: "As a general proposition, if a corporation elects
to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust to hold it answerable
there for any damage caused by defects in those products." Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
72. Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 87 111. App. 3d 279, 280-81, 408 N.E.2d 1007,
1008 (1st Dist. 1980), aff'd, 86 111. 2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203 (1981).
73. 86 Ill. 2d at 433, 427 N.E.2d at 1205. In 1970, Green, Sr., conveyed his business to
Advance Ross and that business became a part of Steel. Id.
74. Id. at 433, 427 N.E.2d at 1204.
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Green, Sr., was replaced as president of the two corporations by his son.
Nevertheless, Green, Sr., was retained as a consultant to Steel until 1978." 5
At that time, the parent corporation instructed Green, Jr., to terminate his
father as a consultant.76 Although Green, Jr., complied with this instruc-
tion, he also provided his father with severance pay in an amount equal
to six months salary." Advance Ross requested that Green, Jr., obtain and
return the money.78 Green, Jr., was discharged when he failed to comply
with this request. 9
Subsequently, Green, Jr., instituted an action against Advance Ross and
Electronics in an Illinois state court, asserting that his employment contract
had been breached."0 The corporate defendants filed a counterclaim and also
moved to join Green, Sr., as an additional counterdefendant.8 ' The
counterclaim alleged that the payment made by Green, Jr., to Green, Sr.,
constituted a misappropriation of corporate assets. 2 The defendants further
claimed that both the father and son, in their former employment capacities,
had engaged in other acts by which they had breached their fiduciary duty
to the corporation.3
75. Id. at 433, 427 N.E.2d at 1205. The record showed that Green, Sr., in his capacity
as a consultant, retained a significant amount of control over Electronics and Steel. Specific-
ally, Green, Sr., maintained control over all construction being handled by Electronics and
Steel, and made all decisions concerning which bidders would receive contracts. Id.
76. Id. at 434, 427 N.E.2d at 1205.




80. Suit was brought against Electronics in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Advance
Ross was included as a defendant because it had guaranteed all amounts payable under Green,
Jr.'s employment contract with Electronics. Id.
81. Id. The claim against Green, Sr., asserted that he had directly, and as a coconspirator
with his son, misappropriated and improperly converted funds of Advance Ross and Electronics.
Id. The Green court rejected the contention that because one conspirator, Green, Jr., was sub-
ject to Illinois jurisdiction, the other conspirator, Green, Sr., also would be amenable. The
court declared:
[T]he theory of jurisdiction based on the acts of a co-conspirator must be that
co-conspirators are each others' agent; thus the argument would be that when a
conspirator commits a tortious act within Illinois he does so as agent for his co-
conspirators, who thereby also becomes subject to this State's jurisdiction.
Id. at 440-41, 427 N.E.2d at 1208. Because Green, Jr., had not committed a tortious act in
Illinois, the court held that the conspiracy claim had to fail. Id. at 441, 427 N.E.2d at 1208.
82. Id. at 434, 427 N.E.2d at 1205.
83. The other alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties included the following acts:
improperly charging defendants for personal expenses of Green, Sr.; using defen-
dants' employees to perform personal work for Green, Sr., on defendants' time;
using defendants' premises and facilities for personal work for Green, Sr., without
payment to defendants for such use; . . . receipt of improper salary payments by
Green, Sr., in a month when he received disability pay from defendants' disability
insurer; entering on behalf of defendants into an improper retainer agreement with
a Texas law firm in which a son of Green, Sr., was a partner and which represented
Green, Sr., at the time the firm represented defendants.
Id. at 434-35, 427 N.E.2d at 1205.
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The jurisdictional basis alleged in the joinder motion was section 17(1)(b),
the tortious act component of the Illinois long arm statute.84 The defen-
dants argued that the ultimate effect of the misappropriation of funds and
other breaches of fiduciary duties was the depletion of Advance Ross's assets
in Illinois.85 Thus, because an adverse financial effect had occurred in Il-
linois, the corporate defendants claimed that a tortious act had been com-
mitted within the state. 6 The trial court found no merit in this argument
and denied the motion to join Green, Sr., as a counterdefendant.87
On appeal, both the appellate court and the supreme court held that a
breach of corporate fiduciary duties by a Texas citizen in Texas, which in-
directly caused a decrease in the assets of a corporation organized and head-
quartered in Illinois, did not constitute the commission of a tortious act
in Illinois."9 Although both courts concluded that Illinois lacked personal
jurisdiction under section 17(l)(b), different analyses were employed to reach
that conclusion.
The Illinois appellate court analyzed the jurisdictional question by focus-
ing on whether Green, Sr., had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois. 9
Acknowledging that a breach of fiduciary duty could be characterized as
tortious,9 ° the court found that the resulting financial injury had occurred
primarily in Texas.9 The court ruled that although Steel received funding
from Advance Ross, an Illinois corporation,92 the actual payment to Green,
Sr., came from the account of Steel, a Texas corporation.93 Therefore, the
immediate decrease in assets occurred in Steel's Texas account, not in Il-
linois. Any indirect impact experienced by Advance Ross in Illinois was held
insufficient, in and of itself, to establish the requisite minimum contacts.9"
The analysis of the Illinois Supreme Court, on the other hand, focused
on whether the conduct of Green, Sr., fell within the ambit of section
17(l)(b)." Again, because there was no question that breaches of a fiduciary
84. The joinder motion alleged jurisdiction under both § 17(l)(a) and § 17(1)(b) of the
long arm statute; however, only § 17(l)(b) was at issue on appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Id. at 435, 427 N.E.2d at 1206.
85. The Texas operations, including the bank account from which the severance pay was
drawn, were funded by the assets of the parent corporation which was located in Illinois. Id.
at 438, 427 N.E.2d at 1207.
86. Id.
87. 87 Ill. App. 3d 279, 280, 408 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (lst Dist. 1980).
88. 86 III. 2d at 440, 427 N.E.2d at 1208; 87 Ill. App. 3d at 286, 408 N.E.2d at 1012.
89. 87 II1. App. 3d at 282, 408 N.E.2d at 1009.
90. Id. at 284, 408 N.E.2d at 1010.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 284, 408 N.E.2d at 1011.
93. Id. at 284, 408 N.E.2d at 1010.
94. Id.
95. 86 I1l. 2d at 436, 427 N.E.2d at 1206. The supreme court declared that it "prefer[red]
to resolve this appeal by looking to the meaning of our own statute." Id. Therefore, the court
sought to determine whether the statute could be construed to embrace the claim against Green,
Sr. Id.
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duty constituted tortious acts, 96 the sole issue for resolution was whether
the tortious acts had been "committed within the state."97 The supreme court
recognized that physical presence was not necessary for a tortious act to
be committed in the state.98 Nevertheless, the court found that in the absence
of physical presence, the injury at least had to occur in Illinois."9 Further,
the court refused to differentiate between physical and economic injury, and
rejected the corporations' argument that for the purposes of financial torts,
jurisdiction should be exercised at the injured party's headquarters.' °° The
supreme court reasoned that the connection between the tortious acts and
Illinois was too tenuous, and that allowing long arm jurisdiction to be exer-
cised would create an undesirable precedent.' Specifically, the court stated
that if jurisdiction were exercised., the rationale could be extended so that
an Illinois resident, who suffered a physical injury anywhere in the country,
would be able to maintain an action in Illinois as long as he had an Illinois
bank account which was depleted by the payment of medical bills.' 2 Conse-
quently, even though the ultimate depletion of assets would occur in Illinois,
where the parent corporation was located, the Green court held that the
alleged tortious acts of Green, Sr., had occurred in Texas.
Cook Associates, Inc. v. Lexington United Corp.
The source of the controversy in Cook was an alleged breach of contract.' °3
Cook Associates, Inc., an Illinois corporation, was an employment agency
with its main office in Chicago, Illinois."' During the period from July 1973
through July 1976, Cook Associates also maintained a branch office in
Massachusetts.' The defendant, Lexington United Corporation ("Lex-
ington"), maintained its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. 6
In May 1976, Lexington contacted Cook Associates's Massachusetts branch
office, requesting information on prospective employees for a field sales
managerial position.'0 7 Resumes were transmitted with an attached fee
schedule on the letterhead of the Chicago office.' The schedule required
Lexington to pay a fee if, within two years, it hired any applicant referred
96. Id. at 437, 427 N.E.2d at 1206.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 437, 427 N.E.2d at 1207.
99. Id. at 438, 427 N.E.2d at 1207.
100. Id. at 438-39, 427 N.E.2d 1207-08.
101. Id. at 439-40, 427 N.E.2d at 1208.
102. Id. at 439, 427 N.E.2d at 1207-08.
103. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 II1. 2d 190, 429 N.E.2d 847 (1981).
104. Id. at 192-93, 429 N.E.2d at 848.
105. Id. at 193, 429 N.E.2d at 848.
106. Id. at 192, 429 N.E.2d at 848.
107. The record was unclear as to the specific type of manager requested by Lexington.
Nevertheless, the Cook court found that the position, though originally described as "national
sales manager," later had been changed to "field sales manager." Id. at 193, 429 N.E.2d at 848.
108. A fee of 20% was assessed for positions with salaries paying at least $15,000 annually. Id.
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by Cook Associates." °9 A Lexington executive interviewed one of the ap-
plicants in Chicago, but the applicant refused Lexington's employment
offer.'°
In July 1976, Cook Associates closed the Massachusetts branch office.''
Within a few months, the woman who had operated that office, Edith McIn-
tosh, opened her own employment service." ' Lexington contacted the woman,
again requesting applicants for a managerial position. This time, however,
the position was described as national sales manager, rather than field sales
manager." 3 McIntosh forwarded to Lexington a resume for the same appli-
cant that Lexington had interviewed during its previous search through Cook
Associates.' After several interviews, the applicant was hired and McIn-
tosh received a $5,000 fee.''
Cook Associates instituted an action against Lexington for breach of con-
tract. The complaint sought to recover the $5,000 fee allegedly due because
Lexington hired an applicant originally referred by Cook Associates." 6 Cook
Associates asserted that Lexington had transacted business in Illinois, and,
therefore, was subject to jurisdiction under section 17(l)(a) of the Illinois
long arm statute." 7 The trial court denied Lexington's motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and granted Cook Associates's motion for
summary judgment." 8 The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial
court lacked personal jurisdiction over Lexington." 9 The Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed this reversal.' 20
As in Green, the appellate court and the supreme court applied different
109. The fee schedule transmitted by Cook Associates to Lexington stated that "[a] fee will
be due from you as to any applicant you hire within two years of our disclosure of his identity,
or of our submission or referral of him, to you." Id.
110. The applicant resided in Missouri and it appears that the meeting was held in Chicago
because the applicant was, at the time of the interview, a regional manager for a Chicago
manufacturer. Id. During the meeting the applicant was offered $22,000 annually for the posi-
tion of "field sales manager." Id.
111. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 407 N.E.2d at 945.
112. 87 111. 2d at 194, 429 N.E.2d at 848; 86 111. App. 3d at 911, 407 N.E.2d at 945.
113. 87 I11. 2d at 194, 429 N.E.2d at 848.
114. Id.
115. The applicant was offered and accepted the position as "national sales manager" for
an annual salary of $25,000. Id. McIntosh was paid $5,000; this figure represented 20% of
the applicant's salary. Id.
116. Id.
117. Cook Associates also alleged that personal jurisdiction could be exercised under the
common law doing business standard. Id. at 196, 429 N.E.2d at 849. The Cook court, however,
found that the activities of Lexington in Illinois, which consisted of one unsuccessful interview
and an exhibit at three trade shows in Chicago, did not constitute the regularity of business
activity required under the doing business doctrine. Id. at 202-03, 429 N.E.2d at 852-53. For
a discussion of the doing business standard, see supra note 47.
118. 86 111. App. 3d at 910, 407 N.E.2d at 945.
119. Id.
120. 87 111. 2d at 204, 429 N.E.2d at 853.
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modes of analysis to reach identical conclusions. Applying the test of
minimum contacts, the appellate court held that insufficient contacts existed
between Lexington, the State of Illinois, and the litigation to establish that
Lexington could have anticipated defending a lawsuit in an Illinois court.' 2'
A chance meeting in Illinois between Lexington and the applicant, and the
receipt of a fee schedule on a Chicago letterhead, were found insufficient
to satisfy the due process requirements. 2 '
In contrast, the supreme court 'examined the facts of the case in light of
the statutory language and determined that Lexington had not transacted
business within the state.'23 Because Lexington's interview of the applicant
in Illinois involved a different managerial position than was involved in the
later interviews, the court concluded that the Illinois negotiations were
unrelated to the subsequent hiring which was the subject matter of the
litigation.' 24 Additionally, since the applicant had rejected Lexington's in-
itial offer, the court determined that a contract had not been formed be-
tween Cook Associates and Lexington.' 25 Because the cause of action did
not arise from a transaction of business in Illinois, Lexington's acts were
not encompassed within the statutory language of section 17(l)(a). Conse-
quently, the supreme court held that jurisdiction could not be maintained
under the long arm statute.
ANALYSIS
In an effort to clarify when nonresident defendants become subject to
the jurisdiction of Illinois courts under the long arm statute, the supreme
court, in Green and Cook, considered the two prong test that generally is
applicable to long arm statutes which enumerate specific acts that must oc-
cur within the state.' Under that test, a court must determine whether the
nonresident's contacts fall within the meaning of the statute and, if so,
whether the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally
permissible.' 27 In restating that test, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
cautioned that the parameters of the Illinois long arm statute were not to
121. 86 Il1. App. 3d at 913, 407 N.E.2d at 947.
122. Id. at 913-14, 407 N.E.2d at 947.
123. 87 I1. 2d at 198, 429 N.E.2d at 850.
124. Id. at 198, 429 N.E.2d at 851.
125. Id. at 198-99, 429 N.E.2d at 851.
126. Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Lexington United Corp., 87 Ill. 2d at 197-98, 429 N.E.2d at
850; Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 86 111. 2d at 436, 427 N.E.2d at 1206.
127. The Green court stated:
We determine first whether it should be construed in a way which embraces defen-
dants' claim against Green, Sr. If the answer is negative . . . applying the tests
the Supreme Court has fashioned . . . to determine whether the assertion of jurisdic-
tion by a State over a nonresident is prohibited by due process safeguards is
unnecessary.
86 I11. 2d at 436-37, 427 N.E.2d at 1206.
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be equated with minimum contacts.' 28 Instead, stressing a statutory construc-
tion independent of the minimum contacts test, the court declared that "[a]
statute worded in the way ours is should have a fixed meaning without regard
''9 129to changing concepts of due process ... .
The court's concern with developing a fixed meaning for the long arm
statute is commendable. Scholars have long recognized that minimum con-
tacts is a vague and unpredictable standard that provides few adequate
guidelines. 3 The minimum contacts analysis prescribed by the United States
Supreme Court requires an examination of the competing interests encom-
passed by fairness and federalism limitations.' 3 ' Thus, the defendant's in-
terest in not being unfairly summoned to appear in a foreign court must
128. In Green, the supreme court determined that the construction of the tortious act subsection
of the long arm statute need not "depend entirely upon decisions determining in what cir-
cumstances due process requirements would permit long-arm jurisdiction." Id. at 436, 427 N.E.2d
at 1206. In Cook, the court applied this determination to the transaction of business provision.
87 Ill. 2d at 197-98, 429 N.E.2d at 850. Moreover, rearticulating the Green pronouncement,
the Cook court stated: "We recently stressed that the boundaries or limits under our statute
are not to be equated with the 'minimum contacts' test under the due process clause." Id.
at 197, 429 N.E.2d at 850. On the other hand, the appellate court had declared that the stan-
dards for analysis under § 17, due process, or doing business, are probably all the same-
minimum contacts. 86 Ill. App. 3d at 912, 407 N.E.2d at 946.
129. Cook, 87 Il1. 2d at 198, 429 N.E.2d at 850 (quoting Green v. Advance Ross Elecs.
Corp.) (emphasis added); Green, 86 I1. 2d at 436, 427 N.E.2d at 1206 (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Royce & Mason, Nonresident Jurisdiction in Business Litigation-Part 1, 53
Cm. B. REc. 100 (1971) (a "judicial crazy quilt" has resulted from attempts to fill interstices
between pronouncements regarding factors central to the minimum contacts analysis); Com-
ment, Constitutional Limitations, supra note I1, at 158-64 (the balancing test typically employed
to determine if a state constitutionally may assert long arm jurisdiction has two fundamental
fla~vs); Note, World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra note 11, at 626-27 (the vagueness of in-
terstate federalism justification enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen is likely to result in lower
court confusion).
131. As articulated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92
(1980), the due process concept of minimum contacts provides two distinct functions. Id. "It
protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." Id. at 292. But
see Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75
Nw. U.L. REV. 1112 (1981). Professor Redish posits that the Court's assumption that the due
process clause encompasses notions of federalism lacks foundation in either the language, history,
or policy of the clause. Id. at 1114. Rather, Professor Redish asserts that the sole concern
of the due process clause is to protect private parties from unjust action by the state. Id.
at 1113. This proposition was recently acknowledged in Insurance Corp. v. Campagnie des
Bauxites de Guinea, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982). In that case, the Supreme Court attempted to
redefine the notion of federalism expressed in World-Wide Volkswagen by declaring:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as ap-
plied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state
sovereignty vis-a-vis other states. . . .The restriction on state sovereign power
described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately
a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.
That clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. . . . Individual actions cannot
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be balanced against the state's interest in having the case adjudicated in the
forum state and the plaintiff's interest in the selected forum.' 3 2 Because the
weight attributed to each of these concerns is subject to the discretion of
individual judges, and because equitable considerations may be appraised-
such as a party's indigency or physical inability to travel-inconsistent results
often are reached.' 33 These inconsistent results necessarily impede the develop-
ment of any predictable standards.
The uncertain nature of long arm jurisdiction will not dissipate until the
United States Supreme Court clarifies the minimum contacts standard.
Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court was warranted in rejecting due pro-
cess as the critical inquiry under the long arm statute. By requiring Illinois
courts to ascertain a fixed meaning through independent statutory construc-
tion, the supreme court in Green and Cook has effectuated a means to
develop static and predictable guidelines for both practitioners and the courts.
After Green and Cook, the activities of a nonresident defendant must fall
within the ambit of the statutory language before long arm jurisdiction can
be exercised. 3 Consequently, Illinois courts are required to focus on the
specific terms appearing in each statutory provision, and to give substance
to those terms. Once particular types of business conduct or tortious activ-
ity are determined to fall within the statutory meaning, future adjudicatory
proceedings will be simplified to the extent that these prior principles will
be reapplied.' 33 For example, if precontract negotiations occurring in Illinois
are deemed to constitute a transaction of business even though a formal
contract was never executed, then this principle essentially becomes a rule
of law applicable in future litigation involving similar types of conduct. Ac-
cordingly, judicial patterns will emerge through case-by-case adjudication.
Because these patterns must be applied consistently to comply with the fixed
meaning mandate, they eventually will become static rules which cannot be
altered to accommodate the equities existing in a particular factual situa-
tion. By requiring a consistent application of long arm principles, Green
change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to
powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
Id. at 2104 n.10 (citations omitted).
132. See supra note 11.
133. Comment, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 11, at 160-61.
134. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
135. By requiring a fixed meaning, the supreme court essentially has mandated the formula-
tion of rules of law which will be applicable to prospective litigation. The advantages of such
rules are two-fold. First, they provide certainty and predictability which afford guidance to
a party seeking to develop future transactions, and, at the same time, avoid being subject to
jurisdiction in a particular state. Second, they relieve the judiciary of the burden of making
ad hoc determinations by weighing factors such as convenience and fairness and, instead, delegate
to the judiciary the task of determining the proper rule and applying it. See Reese, Choice
of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 315-16 (1976); see also Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1689 (1976) (while rules
are arbitrary to the extent that they are both underinclusive and overinclusive, this type of
arbitrariness is more acceptable than the arbitrariness of ad hoc subjective determinations).
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and Cook have ensured a higher degree of uniformity and predictability in
the area of Illinois long arm jurisdiction.
Although the Illinois Supreme Court's desire to develop a fixed meaning
for the long arm statute was justified, the court's directive is ambiguous
in two respects. First, the court failed to define the term fixed meaning. 36
This term clearly implies that the statutory meaning must remain constant,
unsusceptible to change or variation. " 7 Nevertheless, even a static concept
may be initially subject to either a broad, narrow, or intermediate
interpretation.' 38 In both Green and Cook, the court failed to indicate the
breadth of the fixed meaning. Omission of a clear expression regarding the
appropriate breadth of interpretation effectively may defeat the predictabil-
ity desired by the court in requiring a fixed meaning. Illinois courts retain
the discretion to implement the fixed meaning directive based on their con-
ception of its meaning. Although one court might view the term as man-
dating a restrictive interpretation of the long arm statute, another court might
conclude that a broad interpretation is appropriate. Thus, in the absence
of any elucidation as to the scope of the fixed meaning, Illinois courts must
speculate as to its breadth. Indeed, decisions rendered subsequent to Green
and Cook indicate that different courts have conflicting interpretations of
the fixed meaning directive.' 39
Another ambiguous aspect of the Illinois Supreme Court's directive is its
reiteration of the maxim that the boundaries of a state long arm statute
may be narrower than due process.' 0 Ambiguity arises because the court
136. The Green court emphasized that the meaning of the long arm statute should be con-
strued independently of due process, and that the meaning attributed to the statute should
be fixed; yet, the court failed to express whether the meaning should be literal, legal, express,
or implied. For a general discussion of the concept of "meaning," see R. DICKERSON, THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 34-42 (1975).
137. See BLACKS'S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (5th ed. 1979).
138. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 136, at 198-216.
139. See, e.g., Caicos Petroleum Serv. Corp. v. Hunsaker, 551 F. Supp. 152, 154 (N.D.
Ill. 1982) (the effect of Green and Cook is to contract the reach of the long arm statute);
U.S. Reduction Co. v. Amalgament, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 401, 402 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (the state
long arm statute is not to be equated with changing federal standards of due process); Vena
v. Western Gen. Agency, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 779, 784 (N.D. 11. 1982) (jurisdiction under the
Illinois long arm statute is not coextensive with federal due process standards); State Sec. Ins.
Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 530 F. Supp. 94, 96-97 (N.D. 111. 1982) (the correlation between
the Illinois long arm statute and federal due process is "less than one-to-one"). But see Ronco,
Inc. v. Plastics, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 391, 398 (N.D. 111. 1982) (Green and Cook do not declare
that the reach of the Illinois long arm statute is "necessarily narrower" than due process);
see also Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 1982). In Adden, the court
determined that the defendants' negligence in permitting the escape of two prisoners constituted
a tortious act under the Illinois long arm statute because the prisoners, after escaping, caused
a death in Illinois. Id. at 1149, 1155. After determining that the defendants' acts were included
within the meaning of the statutory language, the court decided that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction would violate due process. Id. at 1156. The construction of the long arm statute
in Adden, which exceeded the due process limits, conflicts with the view of other courts that
the reach of the statute has been contracted.
140. See Cook, 87 I1. 2d at 197, 429 N.E.2d at 850. The Cook court stated that "[a] state
is free to set its own limits in acquiring this jurisdiction within the parameters allowed by
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failed to explain whether the long arm statute must be construed more restric-
tively than due process, or whether the maxim was included merely to ex-
press a reality of statutory interpretation; specifically, words have inherent
limitations irrespective of how broadly they are construed,'' and these limita-
tions may, in particular circumstances, necessitate a statutory interpretation
less expansive than due process. The effect will be dramatically different
depending upon which view is adopted.
If the statute must be construed more restrictively than due process, a
retreat from the expansive interpretation historically accorded the long arm
statute will be required. Thus, because the reach of the statute would be
contracted, Illinois residents would encounter more difficulty in obtaining
redress in an Illinois court. On the other hand, if the court's directive does
not require the statute to be construed more restrictively than due process,
a broad interpretation of the statute will continue to be applied. The extent
to which that interpretation is not coextensive with due process will result
from language limitations, rather than a change in the breadth of interpreta-
tion given to the long arm statute.
The court's intent in restating the maxim that state long arm statutes may
be construed more narrowly than due process is complicated further by its
statement that an unconstitutional interpretation of the statute should be
avoided "if possible."' 2 If the boundaries of the statute truly were meant
to be contracted, it would seem unnecessary to include the words if possi-
ble. Indeed, there would be no possibility that the statutory interpretation
could exceed the due process limits if the statute were construed more restric-
tively than required by minimum contacts.
Thus, in the absence of an unequivocal statement of tLhe court's intent
in formulating the fixed meaning directive, Illinois courts are forced to
speculate as to the current scope of the long arm statute. This has resulted
in contradictory conclusions regarding the breadth of the fixed meaning.' 3
Should this trend continue, the intended goals of uniformity, predictability,
and consistency will not be achieved.
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FIXED MEANING DIRECTIVE
Decisions Rendered Subsequent to Green and Cook
A number of decisions rendered subsequent to Green and Cook have
adopted the view that the supreme court's directive requires a more restric-
tive construction of the long arm statute. These decisions refer to the re-
quirement of independent statutory construction as imposing a "higher
the due process clause." Id. This premise originally was articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Perkins v. Benquet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
141. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation
in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 899 (1982) ("[Tihe limitations of language mean
that, even when Congress formulates a specific intent, the words of the statute may not fully
capture the congressional meaning.").
142. Cook, 87 11. 2d at 198, 429 N.E.2d at 850; Green, 86 I11. 2d at 436, 427 N.E.2d at 1206.
143. See supra note 139.
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threshold" ' of activity in the state. In addition, they discuss the correla-
tion between the long arm statute and due process as "less than one-to-




Despite these conclusory statements, the results reached in these decisions
do not indicate a more restrictive construction. For example, in the deci-
sions in which jurisdiction was denied under the transaction of business pro-
vision, it is clear that the defendant would not have been amenable to jurisdic-
tion even under the liberal analysis existing prior to Green and Cook. In
Caicos Petroleum Service Corp. v. Hunsaker,' 7 the court refused to exer-
cise long arm jurisdiction. In that case, the initial meeting concerning the
possible sale of an airplane by the defendant occurred in the West Indies,
all subsequent negotiations were by long distance telephone conversations
and telexes, and the only aspect of the contract performed in Illinois was
the plaintiff's payment by a check drawn on an Illinois bank account.' 8
In U.S. Reduction Co. v. Amalgamet, Inc.,'4 9 the court determined that the
initiation of negotiations by unsolicited telephone calls to an Illinois com-
pany, and the mailing of a purchase contract from New York to Illinois,
were insufficient to confer long arm jurisdiction."' Even under a liberal in-
terpretation of the statute, however, negotiations conducted by telephone
or through correspondence never have been sufficient to sustain personal
jurisdiction absent other contacts with the state. 5 Thus, despite the fact
that these decisions explicitly recognize that a more restrictive interpretation
is necessary, the results reached do not reflect a narrower construction.
144. Caicos Petroleum Serv. Corp. v. Hunsaker, 551 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The
Caicos court noted "that the Illinois court now applies a higher threshold for asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction than the minimum contacts test established in International Shoe." Id. at
154 n.1.
145. State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 530 F. Supp. 94, 96 (N.D. I11. 1981);
see also U.S. Reduction Co. v. Amalgamet, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 401, 403 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (the
interpretation of the Illinois long arm statute that extends it to due process limits no longer
applies); People v. Holt, 91 111. 2d 480, 483, 440 N.E. 2d 102, 103 (1982) (referring to Green,
the court noted that jurisdiction is not always asserted to the boundaries permitted by due process).
146. Vena v. Western Gen. Agency, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 779, 784 (N.D. 111. 1982).
147. 551 F. Supp. 152 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also Knorr Brake Corp. v. Harbil, Inc., 550
F. Supp. 476 (N.D. 111. 1982) (court refused to exercise in personam jurisdiction when there
was no suggestion that individuals either were involved in Illinois activities, or came to Il-
linois); State Sec. Ins. Co. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(jurisdiction denied when defendants had engaged in no purposeful availment of Illinois law).
148. 551 F. Supp. at 155-56.
149. 545 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. I11. 1982).
150. Id. at 403.
151. See, e.g., Colony Press, Inc., v. Fleeman, 17 I11. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1st Dist.
1974) (long arm jurisdiction was exercised because in addition to the fact that the defendant
initiated a transaction by an out-of-state telephone call, the contract was performed in Illinois);
Cook Assocs., Inc. v. Colonial Broach & Mach. Co., 14 111. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27
(1st Dist. 1973) (jurisdiction was exercised because of the defendant's telephone call requesting
resumes for prospective employees and because the employment agency performed the contract
in Illinois).
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Notwithstanding the decisions which interpret Green and Cook as signal-
ing a retreat from the liberal interpretation previously afforded to the long
arm statute, there is one federal district court decision that specifically rebuts
this position. In Ronco, Inc. v. Plastics, Inc.,' 2 the plaintiff sought damages
for breach of contract and breach of warranty, and alleged jurisdiction pur-
suant to the transaction of business provision of the long arm statute." 3
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois upheld
jurisdiction, finding that the defendants had engaged in negotiations in
Illinois, had voluntarily sought the benefits of Illinois laws, and had shipped
a substantial volume of their products into Illinois."' In reaching this con-
clusion, the court maintained that neither Green nor Cook "state[s] or
impl[ies] that the statute's reach is necessarily narrower than the due process
clause, or that the court intended to retreat from the holding of Nelson v.
Miller.""' Rather, the Ronco court determined that Green and Cook sup-
ported the proposition that section 17 is a statute and that questions under
it must be decided, at least initially, as a matter of statutory construction.'
On this basis, the Ronco court rejected the premise that a fixed meaning
requires that the reach of the statute be narrower than due process. 5 7
Of the decisions rendered subsequent to Green and Cook, the Ronco court's
interpretation of the supreme court's directive is the most logically sound.
Unlike other decisions reached after Green and Cook, which equate the fixed
meaning directive with requiring a narrower construction of the long arm
statute, the Ronco court's interpretation does not frustrate the legislative
purpose underlying the statute. The long arm statute is not a vacuous enact-
ment; it is intended to provide redress to Illinois residents to the extent per-
mitted by the due process clause.'" As the Ronco court implicitly recog-
nized, that purpose can be achieved only if the statutory language is inter-
preted liberally.
152. 539 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. II1. 1982).
153. Id. at 394-95.
154. Id. at 395-97.
155. Id. at 398.
156. As the Ronco court accurately acknowledged, rather than adopt a long arm statute
that conferred jurisdiction whenever the due process requirements were fulfilled, the Illinois
General Assembly enacted a statute that provided jurisdiction only when specified tests were
satisfied. Id. Thus, it is unlikely that the legislature intended the statutory requirements of
the Illinois long arm statute to be supplanted by the federal due process standards; such an
intention would render the express language meaningless. As recognized in Green and Cook,
the meaning of the long arm statute is dependent upon the meaning of the separate provisions,
and the language of these provisions must have a fixed meaning without reference to shifting
notions of due process. Cook, 87 Ill. 2d at 198, 429 N.E.2d at 850; Green, 86 111. 2d at 436,
427 N.E.2d at 1206. But cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) (the sole inquiry
is whether due process has been satisfied).
157. The Ronco court stated that "[i]nsofar as their view of the reach of § 17 is concerned,
we believe that Green and Cook Associates do not herald a drastic departure from prior Il-
linois law." 539 F. Supp. at 398.
158. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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Fixed Meaning and Legislative Intent
The Ronco court's position-that the scope of the Illinois long arm statute
is not necessarily narrower than due process-is supported by a recent Il-
linois Supreme Court opinion which made reference to the fixed meaning
directive enunciated in Green. In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin,'"
the court attempted to clarify the scope of the Illinois Messages Tax Act. 6
Analogizing to the long arm statute, the court held that the Messages Tax
Act had a fixed meaning when enacted.' Moreover, the court illuminated
the manner in which a fixed meaning is determined by stating that "[tihe
scope of a statute is fixed by the conditions which exist and the law which
prevails at the time the statute is adopted."'6 2 Therefore, the breadth of
the statutory interpretation accorded to a statute must depend on how it
was intended to be construed at the time it was enacted.' 63
When the Illinois long arm statute was enacted in 1955, it was intended
to expand the in personam jurisdiction of Illinois courts to the limits of
due process.'16 The due process limits were demarcated by the minimum con-
tacts test.' 61 Because the scope of the long arm statute is fixed by the condi-
tions that existed when it was enacted, and because only a liberal interpreta-
tion of the statutory language can expand Illinois long arm jurisdiction to
the limits of due process, it is evident that the fixed meaning must be ascer-
tained based on a broad construction of the statutory language. Thus, the
requirement that a statute have a fixed meaning is not synonymous with
the requirement that a statute be subjected to a narrower interpretation.
The proposition that the broad interpretation historically accorded to the
long arm statute will remain unaffected by the Green and Cook directive
is supported further by the fact that the Illinois General Assembly never
attempted to limit the scope of the statute when reenacting it as part of
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.' 66 It is well established that when a
159. 93 111. 2d 241, 443 N.E.2d 580 (1982).
160. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 467.1-.15 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
161. 93 I11. 2d. at 256, 443 N.E.2d at 587. The Illinois Bell Telephone court stated:
In Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp., we decided that our long-arm statute
was not in a state of vacillation, expanding or contracting such jurisdiction to the
extent permitted by cases decided from time to time construing and applying the
due process clause in determining when jurisdiction over a nonresident is proper.
We held there that our long-arm statute had a fixed meaning without regard to
changes in the concepts of due process. Similarly, we believe the Messages Tax
Act had a fixed meaning when it was enacted regarding what revenues it taxed ...
Id. at 255-56, 443 N.E.2d at 587 (citation omitted).
162. Id. at 255, 443 N.E.2d at 587.
163. The Illinois Bell Telephone court rejected the argument that the scope of the statute
"expands with removal of constitutional limitations on a state's right to tax interstate transac-
tions .. " Id. Rather, the court found that "'statutes are to be construed as they were
intended to be construed when they were passed.'" Id. (quoting People v. Boreman, 401 Ill.
566, 572, 82 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1948)).
164. See supra text accompanying note 33.
165. See supra note 19.
166. See Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209 (1981) (repealing
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statute is reenacted without change, the legislature is presumed to have in-
corporated sub silentio any well-settled judicial interpretation of the statutory
language.' 67 Consonant with the intended purpose of the statute, the Illinois
judiciary has assumed a very liberal attitude in construing the long arm
statute."' The contention that this broad construction is well settled is sup-
ported by the fact that principles, such as those established in Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Corp., 69 have remained unchanged for over
twenty years'7 ° and have served as precedent for decisions rendered in other
states. '' Despite the liberal statutory construction, in adopting the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure, the legislature reenacted without change the long
arm statute which existed in the Illinois Civil Practice Act.' 72 The Illinois
General Assembly's failure to repudiate the liberal interpretation found in
existing Illinois decisions, by changing or refining the original statutory
Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1981)).
167. The United States Supreme Court has declared that "Congress is presumed to be aware
of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
when it reenacts a statute without change." Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); see
also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) (congressional enactment
seen as ratification of judicial construction); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 366
(1951) (when Congress reenacts a statute without modification it is a "fair assumption" that
Congress accepted the judicial construction given to the statute). Commensurate with the United
States Supreme Court's decree, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated, "lilt is well established
that the reenactment of a statute which has been judicially construed is in effect an adoption
of that construction by the legislature unless a contrary intent appears." Union Elec. Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 77 IlI. 2d 364, 380, 396 N.E.2d 510, 517 (1979). The court further
stated that although mere "inaction by the legislature following a judicial construction does
not of itself indicate acquiescence . . . the repeated restatement by this court of the statutory
interpretation over an extended period of time strengthens the presumption of acquiescence
in the face of inaction by the legislature." Id. at 380, 396 N.E.2d at :518; see also Stryker
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 74 11. 2d 507, 513, 386 N.E.2d 36, 38 (1978) (it is axio-
matic that reenactment of a statute is legislative adoption of judicial construction); Hupp v.
Gray, 73 IIl. 2d 78, 86, 382 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (1978) (the legislature is presumed to know
the prior construction given to a statute and to adopt such a construction by reenactment).
168. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
169. 22 II1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
170. The Illinois judiciary continues to apply the Gray principle that the situs of the tortious
act is where the injury occurs. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d
1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1975) (facts analyzed in light of Gray); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Frederick
Mfg. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 189, 193, 440 N.E.2d 360, 362 (3d Dist. 1982) (rationale of Gray
applied).
171. See, e.g., Shanks v. Westland Equip. & Parts Co., 668 F.2d 1165, 1167-68 (10th Cir.
1982); Doggett v. Electronics Corp., 93 Idaho 26, 31, 454 P.2d 63, 67 (1969); see also World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (citing Gray with approval).
172. Compare Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-209 (1981) (ap-
proved August 18, 1981, and effective July 1, 1982) with Illinois Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1981). It might be argued that the Illinois General Assembly could not
have adopted language any more restrictive than that already employed. The strength of that
argument is weakened, however, by the fact that long arm statutes in other states have limited
the breadth of their statutes by incorporating more limiting phraseology. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972). Section 302(a)(3) provides that personal jurisdiction
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language, is indicative of the legislature's acquiescence to the courts' broad
interpretation of the long arm statute.
If Green and Cook were deemed to require a more restrictive construc-
tion of the long arm statute, then Illinois courts inevitably would have to
retreat from the more expansive interpretations accorded to the statute. For
example, because the Gray decision extended the Illinois long arm statute
to the outermost limits of due process,' 7 there is little possibility that its
interpretation could remain good law under a narrower construction of the
statute. Yet, because the judiciary's role is to construe the statute in accor-
dance with its legislative purpose, and because the Illinois General Assembly
implicitly approved the breadth of interpretation historically imparted to the
long arm statute, the Illinois Supreme Court would have little authority for
reverting to a narrower construction.
CONCLUSION
Despite the ambiguities in the fixed meaning directive, and the decisions
rendered after Green and Cook which view the directive as requiring a nar-
rower interpretation, it is doubtful that Green and Cook will have a pro-
found impact on the reach of the long arm statute. The Illinois Supreme
Court's rejection of the premise that the statute is coterminous with due
process does not necessitate the conclusion that there will be a more restric-
tive construction. After Green and Cook, personal jurisdiction questions aris-
ing under the long arm statute must be examined based on the fixed mean-
ing of the statutory language. That fixed meaning will be based on the
legislative purpose underlying the statute. Because the General Assembly in-
tended to expand long arm jurisdiction to the limits of due process, it is
probable that the Illinois judiciary will continue to invoke as broad an in-
terpretation of the statutory provisions as the language will allow. Therefore,
if any reasonable construction of the statutory language can encompass the
acts of a nonresident defendant, it is unlikely that Illinois courts will deny
its residents redress by dismissing the case on the grounds that it is outside
the scope of the long arm statute.
Barbara S. Farrar
may be exercised over a nonresident defendant in any cause of action arising from the commis-
sion of a tortious act outside the state which causes an injury to a person or property within
the state, if the nonresident:
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from the interstate or international commerce ...
Id. Thus, if the legislature had desired to contract the reach of the Illinois long arm statute,
it easily could have done so by qualifying the types of acts which must occur in order to
satisfy the transaction of business or tortious act provisions.
173. See Note, Nonresident Corporation Subject to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under Il-
linois Civil Practice Act, 1961 U. IE. L.F. 750, 755 (the Gray rationale represents "one of
the furthest extensions to date of the doctrine of International Shoe").
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